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abstract:  The paper addresses the historical and institutional background of labour management poli-
cies in Saudi Arabia. It envisages it as a long-term, structural impediment to the successful and rapid im-
plementation of Saudization (localisation) of the labour force in the Kingdom. The paper thus emphasises 
the socio-political stakes and challenges to localisation of the labour force and, more generally, economic 
and labour reform in the Gulf States. Since the onset of the Arab uprisings, however, unemployment 
among Saudis, and especially women, has become a burning political issue. Governmental actors had no 
choice but to attempt to regain control over the economy and the management of the labour market. In 
September 2011, in spite of a spurt in foreign labour recruitment since the mid-2000s, a voluntary policy 
called “Nitaqat” aiming to “Saudize” the Kingdom’s workforce was enacted. This paper reviews its charac-
teristics and points to its all-encompassing design as it addresses the socio-political context of Saudiza-
tion and therefore is more likely to have a lasting effect than previous workforce localisation initiatives. 
Keywords:  Saudi Arabia, Foreign Population, National Population, National and Foreign Labour, 
Policy, Unemployment, Statistics, Saudization, Irregular Migration, Amnesty, Deportation, Citizenship.
The Socio-political Background and Stakes of ‘Saudizing’ 
the Workforce in Saudi arabia: the Nitaqat policy
Françoise De Bel-Air
Introduction 
T he Nitaqat campaign for the Saudization1 of the workforce was launched mid-2011. This pro-gramme is the latest of many initiatives aiming to replace foreign workers in the private sector with Saudis, previously largely accomplished through various employment quota targets.2 Such 
past policies have met with little success, and many studies have provided explanations for the failure 
of these initiatives.3 In marked contrast with previous labour-indigenisation endeavours, the “Nitaqat” 
(“ranges” or “zones”) policy endows new Saudization measures with exceptional urgency. The govern-
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ment’s approach to the issue, indeed, shows extreme voluntarism. Moreover, it combines incentives and 
rewards as well as sectorial quota rules with price-oriented tools (subsidies and taxes). Above all, it is a 
very wide-ranging policy, which also addresses some socio-political features of labour market manage-
ment specific to Saudi Arabia (and to other GCC countries) such as the sponsorship issue. Existing 
assessments of Nitaqat and its outcomes concentrate on the economic aspects of the policy.4 Indeed, the 
Saudization issue (and that of localisation of the workforce in the GCC states in general) is most often 
taken as solely an economic issue. Similarly, Saudization (and localisation) policies, and the explanations 
given for their failures, are most often viewed or studied only from the economic point of view. Therefore, 
reasons for the repeated failures of earlier policies, and Nitaqat’s potential input in enticing local workers 
to the private sector are hard to capture.  
In order to propose an explanation for the persistent difficulties encountered by policy-makers in 
localising the private sector’s workforce in Saudi Arabia, the paper resituates the issue in a wider per-
spective that includes the political stakes of labour and socio-economic segmentation between nationals 
and foreign citizens. Moreover, the paper emphasizes Nitaqat’s socio-political ambition beyond that of 
reforming the Saudi economy. First, the paper identifies and highlights the background, long-term so-
cio-political factors that constrained the implementation of previous Saudization policies. Among these 
factors is the embedding of the dependency on foreign labour and sponsorship (kafala) in the Kingdom’s 
political history, which endows attempts to regulate foreign labour inflows with high political stakes. A 
second set of long-term challenges to rapid Saudization of the labour force are of a demographic nature: 
the increasing numbers of new applicants to the labour market every year and the low, yet regularly in-
creasing levels of economic participation of Saudi women. The third section of the paper describes short-
er-term issues stemming from these structural factors that compelled the regime to take drastic action to 
address the mounting claims for better redistribution of resources voiced during the Arab uprisings. This 
context emphasised the necessity for the Saudi state to regain control over the management of workforce 
to face international commitments to migrants’ rights and non-discrimination, to fight unemployment, 
especially among women, and to accommodate rising numbers of young highly educated Saudis. The 
fourth section focuses on the specifics of the Nitaqat programme and the extent to which Nitaqat-led 
overhauling of the Saudi labour market will address the previously mentioned socio-political challenges 
to Saudization. The first results of the programme, in addition to those of the irregular workers’ amnesty 
period and crackdown campaign conducted during 2013, show mixed results in terms of replacement of 
the foreign workforce by locals. As regards the labour recruitment decision-making process, however, the 
programme had important consequences. The paper thus concludes that beyond the issue of economic 
reform attached to Nitaqat lies an ambition of deep social and political reform in the Kingdom.
Socio-political obstacles to Saudization Initiatives
Dependency on Foreign Labour, Its History and Characteristics
The presence of numerous foreign labourers in the Gulf States’ labour markets, which spurred labour 
nationalisation policies such as Nitaqat, and policies applied to them are rooted in the political history 
of these countries. As stated by Seccombe and Lawless,
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While international labor flows were considerably accelerated by the events of the 1970s, the region’s 
dependence on foreign workers dates from the first oil-induced economic boom which followed the 
initial discovery of oil on the Arabian shore of the Gulf in the 1930s.5   
Oil was first discovered in Saudi Arabia in the early 1930s. Elsewhere in the region, the British 
rulers and British oil companies received concessions from local Sheikhs to exploit the oil reserves and 
organize workers’ recruitment: the workforce was recruited from Western countries, Iran, Iraq, and the 
Indian subcontinent. In Saudi Arabia, by contrast, American companies (CASOC – later Aramco – and 
the Standard Oil Company of California [SOCAL]) had an exclusive concession over oil fields in Al-
Hasa in the eastern region. From the onset, in the concession agreements, King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud 
imposed provisions for Saudi workers to be employed in priority, and the employment of foreign workers 
was subject to prior Saudi government approval.6 In 1949, for instance, Aramco employed 10,000 Saudi 
workers, of which 1,600 were skilled or semi-skilled. Ten years later, in 1959, 11,682 of the 16,000 em-
ployees were Saudi nationals, making up 66 per cent of the qualified personnel. Saudi Arabia thus wit-
nessed the emergence of a local proletariat that conducted strikes and labour protests during the 1950s to 
obtain better material conditions and social packages than expatriates.7 Indeed, the Italian and Eritrean 
labourers recruited by Aramco as well as labourers of other nationalities, among which were some Indi-
ans working for other companies, also had to resort to strikes to protest their appalling living conditions.8 
After the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the recruitment patterns increasingly shifted towards Arab workers, 
including Palestinians, to meet work force needs. This first phase of the onset of oil exploitation was thus 
characterised by the progressive fostering of a workers’ movement, whose nationalist claims were chan-
nelled through demands for preferential employment. Beyond the issue of labour, therefore, lies the issue 
of nation-building: in Saudi Arabia, like elsewhere in the Arab Gulf, the nation-building process spurred 
the need to define who would be entitled to a share of the oil “rent”9 hence shaping the “nationals” as op-
posed to the “foreigners.” Political allegiance to the rulers was negotiated for in return for redistribution 
of the oil wealth, which conditioned citizenship and marked the onset of the rentier “social contract.”10 
In the Kingdom, the dependency on foreign labourers is thus not only economic (performing specialized 
economic tasks), it is also has a political aspect: the presence of foreign nationals and their subordination 
to citizens in terms of rights associated with citizenship (including benefitting from the oil wealth) actu-
ally enhances the nationals’ privileged status. 
The dependency on foreign labour grew tremendously after the October 1973 war, which trig-
gered a four-fold increase in oil prices. The phenomenal increase in the Gulf States’ incomes spurred 
large-scale construction, industrial, and infrastructural projects. The demand for migrant labour rose, and 
they performed an increasing part of the productive work over the years. The benefits of these produc-
tive activities as well as the oil rent itself were transformed into material wealth and welfare packages 
for nationals – which led to the emergence of a class of “white collar,” well-paid but unproductive state 
employees – in return for citizens’ political allegiance. This second period of the “oil boom” achieved the 
formation of “dual labour markets.” The supremacy of nationals over non-nationals in the economy was 
viewed by Gulf citizens as essential for the reproduction of the fragile rentier social contracts binding 
them to their rulers, but this also led to the formation of “dual societies.” The benefits of citizenship could 
only be enhanced by the political distinction between citizens and non-citizens based on descent (jus 
sanguinis). The Gulf countries therefore do not conceive of themselves as immigration countries that 
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would allow long-term settlement, and family reunion and citizenship acquisition are not an issue. As 
temporary contractual labourers, expatriates are expected to leave upon the termination of their employ-
ment contracts, and this explains the skewed demographic structure (mostly men of working age) of 
migrant communities in the region. 
Sponsorship and the “Privatization” of Labour
The Gulf States’ migration policies which forbid non-workers’ entry and long-term settlement are dif-
ferent from guest workers programmes, which were/are overlooked by states. The Kafala (sponsorship)11 
institution, which is instrumental in subordinating expatriates to Gulf nationals, actually delegates to 
citizens the responsibility for controlling and regulating the presence and activities of foreigners on the 
national territory, everywhere else a state prerogative.12 In the Gulf countries, a sponsor (kafeel), a place-
ment agency, a company/institution, or any individual under the condition that he or she is a citizen of 
the given GCC country issues the employment contract. The system requires the local employer to bear 
full economic, social, and legal responsibility for the employee during the contract period. In return, the 
kafeel has the upper hand on salary and work conditions, and movements within and outside the country 
(symbolically, the sponsor often retains the worker’s passport).13 Until recently, as explained previously, 
switching sponsors was also impossible without a “no-objection certificate” from the first sponsor. 
For these reasons, the kafala underlies the formation of the “dual labour markets” characterizing 
Gulf countries: the impossibility to switch kafeel bars expatriates from professional competition and 
upscale mobility, i.e., from a real labour “market.” The sponsorship system, which delegates to citizens 
the responsibility for controlling and regulating the presence and activities of foreigners on the national 
territory, thus also reproduces the socio-political “structural dependence”14 of the foreign worker vis-à-
vis Saudi (and other Gulf countries’) citizens. This “privatization” of foreign recruitment not only allows 
“keeping migrant workers at check.”15 It also makes the kafeel an intermediary between the foreign 
worker or investor, the receiving country’s society, and the state. The sponsorship system thus holds a 
structural role in the definition and reproduction of citizenship and the rentier social contract in the 
Gulf. Probably as a response to citizenship claims, which erupted in the 1950s among Saudi workers, the 
kafala became formalized and appeared, for example, in Saudi Arabia’s 1952 Residency Law as a manda-
tory prerequisite for every foreign temporary resident. Thus, sponsorship’s high political stakes explains 
the reluctance of regimes to repeal it, and more generally, to strongly intervene in the management of 
the foreign workforce.
The Issue of Foreign Labour’s Management
The sponsorship system benefits the citizens economically in an indirect way by transferring oil rev-
enues to nationals. Traditionally, and until the early 2000s in Saudi Arabia, every citizen was entitled to 
a certain amount of work visas, depending on his/her social influence; sometimes, these could number 
thousands.16 The assumption was that the kafeel would employ the expatriates he/she sponsors. Spon-
sors were therefore economic agents, earning a living from the import of workforce. However, by facili-
tating the process of importing work force, the kafala contributed to pushing up the foreign labourers’ 
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population. Indeed, sponsors having a personal economic interest in bringing more expatriates into the 
country contributed to disconnecting the management of the workforce from the dynamics of supply 
and demand. 
Moreover, the trade of visas, now a matter of legal procedure in Saudi Arabia, also sustained high 
numbers of expatriates. In some cases, the prospective sponsor would grant the expatriate a work visa 
but leave the person responsible for finding employment once he/she arrived in the Kingdom and would 
then either sell his sponsorship rights to another employer17 or expect from the worker/ business person 
a regular fee, a share of benefits, or a participation in the latter’s activities. In 2004, the then Saudi Min-
ister of Labour Dr. Ghazi Al-Gosaibi acknowledged that 70 percent of visas issued were actually sold 
on the black market. 
However, a careful planning of human resources in Saudi Arabia is also hampered by other political 
factors. Business elites, for instance, have their own agenda as regards supply of workers; moreover, they 
have the socio-political agency necessary to resist governmental attempts to regulate the labour market. 
The state-supportive bureaucracy, which emerged during the boom years of the 1970s, has been siding 
with the strong business class created through the distribution of contracts and investment incentives to 
allies of the ruling families operating from Chambers of Commerce (of whom many are from the Nejd 
region) to persistently oppose any reform of the economy.18 After the mid-1980s and the “bust” years of 
falling oil prices, reform measures taken by the state had repeatedly to be withdrawn, and neither limita-
tion of labour imports nor Saudization measures could be implemented.19  
Nevertheless as Gwenn Okruhlik (1999) suggested, the business classes in the Gulf States can-
not be characterised either by their so-called “rentier mentalities” or by some speculative orientation of 
private investors in the region. In fact, the nature of the rentier state itself, fuelled by the distribution 
of resources and assets along personal and patronage lines, makes a confidence-based and predictable 
business environment unlikely; it thus forbids long-term planning and development. This feeling of in-
security is reflected in the movement of workers’ stocks and flows: Birks, Seccombe, and Sinclair (1986) 
noticed that a drop in new work permit issues rapidly followed cuts in government expenditures. How-
ever, renewal of permits simultaneously increased, “a reflection of labour-hoarding by some employers” 
(p. 810). This suggests that the feeling of insecurity of business owners leads to under-employment of 
foreign labourers. They are kept in reserve until economic recovery for fear of drastic shifts in the labour 
supply policies, known to depend greatly on political decisions.20 Added to the ease of entry and sojourn 
in the Kingdom (many foreign pilgrims could overstay their Hajj and Umrah visas while other migrants 
enter illegally, especially through the 1,800-km-long and porous border with Yemen), this created large 
pools of irregular workers, thus cheap and easily available. The scale of the 2013 “correction campaign,” 
which led to the departure of more than one million expatriates and five million cases of status correc-
tion,21 is a measure of the magnitude of the problem; after the campaign, estimates of irregular workers 
and sojourners in the range of five million circulated in the Saudi press.
The socio-political context of migration and population (non-)management also explains why 
until the 2000s available data on Saudi Arabia population was scarce, scattered, and of questionable 
reliability.22 
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Challenges to Saudizing the Workforce
The Enduring Demographic Pressure on the Labour Market
So far we have reviewed factors explaining the structural difficulties and socio-political stakes of enforc-
ing Saudization and sponsorship reform measures under governmental control. Against this backdrop, 
we now move to a major long-term structural issue that explains why labour and economic reform is 
urgent in Saudi Arabia: the high demographic growth rates of the Saudi population.
Indeed, available data, though scarce, indicate that the rate of growth of the Saudi population in 
the mid-1970s was around 4.2 per cent per year. This was due to high levels of fertility (natural increase), 
since naturalisations were few and accounted for no more than 0.03 per cent of the increase.23 In 1987, 
the Gulf Child Health Survey estimated the Saudi TFR at 6.5 children per woman.24 The policies gov-
erning population growth were pro-natalist in effect: oil wealth catered generously for the needs of large 
families and high fertility rates were promoted by traditional and religious sectors of society.25 
table 1: Some indicators of Saudi fertility (2004-2013)
Available data on fertility are very scarce and cannot be assessed for lack of comparable alternative 
sources. Nevertheless, data that emanates from CDSI (Table 1) suggests that relative fertility has been 
decreasing for at least a decade. Saudi women who were born at times of high fertility (until the early 
1990s) now give birth to less children on average. Consequently, the share of the children (aged 0 to 14) 
dropped from 49.2 per cent of the total Saudi population in 1992 to 35 per cent mid-2013. 
Yet, this remains a high figure. Even though youth’s relative share is decreasing, their numbers are 
still expanding (6.1 million in 1992; 7.1 million in 2013). As the number of live births has also been 
increasing (Table 1), it is expected that the demographic pressure on infrastructure (education, health, 
leisure, etc.) will continue for some years. 
  Total Fertility 
Rates (children 
per women) 
Live births
 
2004 3.60 474,932
2005 3.53 482,252
2006 3.46 488,980
2007 3.39 495,063
2008 3.31 499,095
2009 3.24 503,689
2010 3.17 507,079
2011 3.10 510,495
2012 3.03 n.a.
2013 2.96 n.a.
Source: CDSI (http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/socandpub/facomunty)
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Figure 1: Evolution of the number and share of youth 
in Saudi population (selected years)
Moreover, even though the Saudi demographic growth rate came down to 2.21 per cent in 2013, 
the number of prospective new entrants to the labour market (aged 15 to 19 years) continued increasing 
until that year in absolute terms (Figure 1). Those reaching the age of 20 were about 400,000 in 2013, up 
from a quarter of a million two decades earlier in 1992.
Most Saudi Women are Inactive, for Now 
Until very recently, however, the demographic pressure on the labour market was minimised by the very 
low rates of activity of Saudi females. 
As can be seen from Figure 2, the Saudi female labour force is very small: 193,786 females in 1992, 
increasing to 1,064,387 in 2013. By comparison, active men were 4,135,000 in 2013. The overall share of 
active women (employed and unemployed seeking employment), or female activity rates, also moved up 
from 5.6 per cent of the total female population in 1992 to 17.2 per cent in 2013,26 a trebling of the rate 
in twenty years. Yet, Saudi females’ level of economic participation is still very low, even by the region’s 
standards: in Kuwait, for instance, females’ activity rates reached 47.4 per cent in 2013 (PACI data). 
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Figure 2: Saudi female population by relation to labour force
(selected years, 1992 to 2013)
  These very low rates of activity raise two sets of issues: one is the socio-political stakes of persuad-
ing women to join the labour market. The very fact of females taking on jobs even in gender-segregated 
sectors such as the retail of lingerie, for example, has spurred very violent opposition from some parts of 
the citizenry and even direct death threats to government actors.27 
Another issue at stake in females’ high rates of inactivity today is their future demographic pressure 
on the labour markets when rising numbers of female citizens will seek jobs. To date, indeed, more than 
80 per cent of all Saudi women and 70 per cent of the most active age groups (25-29 and 30-34 years) 
are out of the labour market. Therefore, one can say that the worst pressure is yet to come.
Emergence of Unemployment
Saudi females have been hard hit by unemployment: the rates tripled between 1992 and 2013 (from 11.8 
per cent to 35.3 per cent of females aged 15-64 years). This is a sign that Saudi females increasingly look 
for opportunities to enter the labour market, even if some measures passed in the framework of Nitaqat 
may also have led to enhancing the rates since 2011.28 Of active Saudi women, 363,269 were unem-
ployed in 2013, which is a very high total rate (35.3 per cent), and up to 60.3 per cent of the youngest age 
groups (15-25 years) alone. Comparatively, Saudi males seem less affected by the phenomenon, assuming 
that data is accurate.29 Indeed, the issue of unemployment is said to have emerged after the First Gulf 
War of 1990-91 that tremendously tightened the government’s budget and compelled it to emphasize 
Saudization of the private sector in the Fourth and Fifth Development Plans. Unemployment started 
affecting university graduates in particular: 20 to 30 per cent of them were said to be looking for employ-
ment as of the mid-2000s.30  
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Figure 3: Evolution of unemployment rates by sex since 1999 (Saudi population)
Education: Mismatches but Levels Are on the Rise
Saudi females are no less educated than Saudi males nowadays. University graduates make up 16.5 per 
cent of both male and female populations aged 15 and above (bachelor’s degree and above) in 2013. As 
compared to 1992, the evolution of literacy has been striking: twenty years ago, university graduates were 
only 6.2 per cent (men) and 2.7 per cent (females) and almost half of all Saudi women (and 20 per cent 
of men) were illiterate. Saudi students who graduated in 2010-2011 were mostly specialised in humani-
ties, religion, and teaching (60 per cent of female graduates, for instance), which employers say are ill 
suited to the current labour market demands. In spite of this, however, graduates and their families ex-
pect socioeconomic returns from such educational achievements, an expectation that has to be addressed 
by the regime in terms of provision of employment.
Figure 4: Saudi graduates by sex and speciality, academic year 2010-2011
Source: Census 1992; Labour Force Surveys 1999 to 2013
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Saudi students enrolled in several study abroad schemes, such as the King Abdullah Scholarship 
Programme, numbered as high as 174,645 for the academic year 2011-2012. Such programmes aim at 
encouraging young Saudis to acquire world-class academic training in scientific and related specialities 
(medicine, engineering, law, accounting, and marketing, for instance) in overseas universities, so as to 
upgrade the skill level of future Saudi manpower in line with international standards. Since its inception 
in 2005 up to the end of 2013, 47,000 young Saudis graduated from that programme. Some may choose 
to stay abroad but others will come back to Saudi Arabia. Those who return will expect to find gainful 
and socially-rewarding professional opportunities and career prospects in the private sector there.31  
Saudi arabia in the World: political pressures to reform
International Membership
A short-term factor compelling Saudi Arabia to enforce labour reforms is the Kingdom’s embedding in 
the global economy. The Gulf States in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular, are increasingly active in 
international organisations, which compels them to commit to the observance of certain labour policies 
and internationally recognised core labour standards. For instance, since 2005, Saudi Arabia has been a 
member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This commits the Kingdom to “further liberalize its 
trade regime and accelerate its integration in the world economy, while offering a transparent and pre-
dictable environment for trade and foreign investment in accordance with WTO rules.”32 The increased 
economic participation of Saudi labourers in the private sector is also part of the commitments made by 
Saudi Arabia. 
Saudi Arabia also ratified a number of international agreements on labour and human rights,33 
including both ILO Convention No. 100 (1951) on Equal Remuneration and ILO Convention No. 111 
(1958) on Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) in 1978 that prohibits racial discrimination. 
Therefore, the existing “dual labour market” characterising the Saudi economy whereby nationals are 
systematically, by virtue of their nationality, paid less than the non-nationals, as well as the kafala institu-
tion which entails a political hierarchy and unequal access to basic socio-political rights between citizens 
and non-citizens, stand in contradiction to international commitments on migrants’ rights attached to 
WTO membership.34  
Oil Revenues and the Social Contract
Saudi Arabia is under international pressure for reforming its economy, but domestically, the Kingdom 
is also facing the urgency of restoring popular support to the regime, which has deteriorated since the 
1980s. Dwindling oil revenues after 1985, combined with the high levels of Saudi population growth, 
drastically limited the redistributive capacities of the state. Cuts were made in public sector job offers, 
which threatened the stability of the rentier social contract. Youth unemployment and even poverty be-
came increasingly visible in the early 2000s, aggravated by the liberal adjustment policies implemented as 
part of the requirements for WTO membership. Moreover, as oil prices and domestic revenues had risen 
again since 2003, the Kingdom undertook massive infrastructure projects; 2.5 million jobs were created, 
yet to the sole benefit of foreign labourers.35 Surging oil revenues did not translate into significant job 
creation for citizens in the productive sector where work hours are longer, job security unguaranteed, and 
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pressure on productivity is high but salaries are much lower, and not sufficient for a young national to 
sustain family expenditures.36 This greatly affected what remained of the rentier social contract37 during 
the decade.
Arab Uprisings
Protests voiced in the Kingdom during the 2011 “Arab Uprising” indeed focused on lagging income in 
the first place, alongside corruption, “discriminatory clientelism”38 and unequal access to oil revenues. 
In view of the deterioration of the social contract in the country, the risk of unrest among the roughly 
20 million Saudis, of who a quarter were in the age group of 15-29 years, was taken very seriously. 
Emergency redistribution measures were decided at the highest political level. Among these were a 
massive $130 billion subsidy package to fund new housing programmes, the setting of a minimum wage 
for nationals in the private sector to SR3,000 ($800), and the launching of the Hafiz programme that 
provided a monthly allowance of SR2,000 ($533) to male and female Saudi job-seekers for up to one 
year. Additionally, the government also raised the minimum wage of public servants and created more 
employment opportunities in the government sector. 
The Nitaqat Campaign: addressing Socio-political Issues and Challenges to 
Saudizing the private Sector
Nitaqat: Main Features
The previously-mentioned measures were connected to the Nitaqat campaign for the Saudization of the 
workforce formally launched in June 2011. The implementation of the programme started in September 
2011, when all companies were asked to update their employee information, both at the General Or-
ganization for Social Insurance (GOSI) and the Ministry of Interior, to calculate their nationalisation 
quotas. Nitaqat combines incentives that encourage firms to hire Saudis and sanctions for non-compli-
ant ones. The system classifies businesses by band (red, yellow, green and excellent/premium), based on 
nationalisation performance (percentage of Saudi employees in the total workforce). The objectives set 
vary in relation to industry (45 categories) and to the size of workforce employed in the company: micro 
(0–9 employees), small (10–49 employees), medium (50–499 employees), large (500–2999 employees), 
and very large (3,000+ employees). Micro entities are exempted from the programme, but are required to 
employ at least one Saudi. Hence, 180 different nationalization quotas (45*4) were defined, according to 
the size and activities of business entities. 
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table 2: target percentage of Saudization in size of business category
The Saudization rate also takes into account the employee’s salary: since a minimum salary for 
nationals of SR3,000 was set in 2013, lower salaries cannot be incorporated in the Saudization ratio. 
Hence, an employee granted a salary of only SR1,500 counts as half a Saudi recruit. Additional cred-
its are granted for businesses employing females, disabled Saudis, ex-convicts, citizens of other GCC 
countries, non-Saudi spouses of Saudi citizens, non-Saudis with Saudi mothers (“special foreigners”), 
part-time workers, students, and members of displaced tribes from the Rub’ al Khali with a Saudi pass-
port but no national identity card.39 The calculation of the firm’s Saudization rate is performed using as 
a thirteen-week moving average of the number of Saudi workers registered with the GOSI.
Companies that come under the “Excellent” zone enjoy a number of advantages and are provided 
certain services, incentives, and facilities by the Labour Ministry. Companies falling within the yellow 
and red zones that do not meet the Saudisation quotas are deprived of services, as described in Table 3. 
table 3: Implications of Nitaqat classification of companies
  
Business Size Red Yellow Green Premium
Small (10 - 49) 0 - 4% 5 - 9% 10 - 39% > 40%
_
_
_Medium (50 - 499) 0 - 5% 6 - 11% 12 - 39% > 40%
Large (500 - 2,999) 0 - 6% 7 - 11% 12 - 39% > 40%
Huge (3,000+) 0 - 6% 7 - 11% 12 - 39% _> 40%
Source: Ministry of Labour
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• Fines for redundant expatriates ($26,700)  
• No possibility to open files for new businesses and/ or
new branches  
Grace period: Six months to improve Nitaqat record 
Red Punitivemeasures
 
 
• 
• Fines for redundant expatriates ($26,700) 
Grace period: Six months to improve Nitaqat record 
Complete freedom in hiring employees 
Easier visa  processing
Freedom to change profession of employees even for
some restricted categories  
Freedom to change foreign workers’ profession
Freedom to recruit employees from Red and Yellow
zones and transfer their visas  
Barred from renewing work permit (capping of stay) after
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The Socio-Political Concerns of Nitaqat 
Compared to previous Saudization initiatives, the setup of Nitaqat is characterised by its all-encompass-
ing approach. Indeed, beyond the issues of reducing unemployment by attracting Saudis, and especially 
women, to the private sector and apart from starting to abide by international commitments, it also 
tackles the socio-political context of Saudi Arabia’s high dependency on foreign labour. 
Besides aiming to reduce dysfunctional employment of the foreign workforce (in yellow and red 
zones) by making it more expensive for local employers, Nitaqat seeks to transform the economy by 
making private employment attractive for locals. Apart from the incentives described earlier and linking 
high salaries to better Saudisation credits, a wage protection system was set up. On November 11, 2014 
the Labour Ministry announced that the minimum wage for Saudis in the private sector would be raised 
to SR5,300 in 2015.40  
Within the Nitaqat policy, a feminisation drive was also launched: besides additional Saudisation 
credits granted for the employment of females in private businesses, the policy seems to tend towards 
the much publicised full feminisation and Saudization of certain sectors of the economy relevant to 
females, especially in the retail sector. After King Abdullah signed a decree banning men from working 
in lingerie and cosmetics shops, for instance, the Ministry of Labour issued two ministerial decisions re-
quiring certain businesses in the retail sector to employ Saudi females, first those selling beauty products 
and lingerie and later shops selling women’s evening and wedding gowns, accessories and the traditional 
female cloak (abaya). A third phase of the project would target shops selling women’s perfumes, maternal 
care goods, shoes, vanity bags, readymade dresses, women’s clothing and dressmaking materials. As of 
late May 2014, other sectors are also being considered for feminisation in the industrial sector. Women 
are also entitled to own or manage their own businesses.
Source: Hussein, 2014; MoL, undated; press sources quoting government officials.
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Other measures taken within the realm of Nitaqat suggest that the enhancement of foreign la-
bourers’ protection schemes is another target of the policy. In March 2014 at the 25th session of the 
UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, Saudi Arabia agreed to 181 out of 225 recommendations on 
human rights reforms made by UN member states. These recommendations not only included commit-
ments to improve protection for labour rights, but a number of measures that had to be enacted before 
the approvals were formally announced. For example, Saudi Arabia recently ratified the International 
Labour Organization Convention’s article 138 requiring a minimum working age of 15. In 2013 alone, 
agreements protecting migrant workers have been signed with the Philippines, Sri Lanka, India, and 
Indonesia. These agreements address key concerns over worker pay, holidays, health insurance, possession 
of passports, as well as the right to change employers (change of sponsorship) as mentioned previously.41 
For instance, a measure passed mid-2014 allows the workers to seek new employers if their sponsors fail 
to provide them with work and residency permits within three months of their arrival in the Kingdom 
and not only if sponsors are in the red or yellow zone of the nationalisation scheme. Under the scheme, 
stranded workers can seek a job with employers whose job opportunities match their profession. Work-
ers are also allowed to contact private recruitment companies in the Kingdom for temporary work. The 
issue of expats’ minimum salary is also discussed and would be implemented in 2015 at an amount of 
SR2,500 monthly. 
The labour inspection department within the Ministry of Labour also significantly enhanced its 
activities and mandate. New inspectors were recruited, new technical means were granted to them in 
order to report and act upon labour violations more efficiently (systematic labour inspection plans, palm 
tablets and standardised reporting templates, and improved connection of all regions with a central 
investigation centre). The department also held awareness campaigns for business owners in order to 
inform them on violation-free working environment. Joint actions with other ministries and entities 
were also conducted, for instance with the Ministries of Commerce and Industry and Interior (the police 
department) and with municipalities.
Nitaqat also addresses some aspects of the kafala (sponsorship) rule. Certain categories of expatri-
ates had been already exempted from the sponsorship rule since 2000 (i.e., investors). Yet, the rule would 
apply to all other expatriates: each foreign national (with the exception of other GCC countries’ citizens) 
willing to work in Saudi Arabia must have a local Saudi entity or national sponsoring the individual for 
work and residency visa purposes. This authorisation is obtained by the employer through the Ministry 
of Labour and the Passport Office of the Ministry of the Interior. In addition, a transfer of sponsorship 
from one sponsor to another would not be considered before the expatriate has completed two years with 
a sponsor, who additionally would have to provide a No Objection Certificate (NOC) permitting the 
transfer. As per the Nitaqat programme, the employees in the “red” and “yellow” categories can transfer 
their sponsorship to “green” and ”excellent” categories without NOC from the previous sponsor. This ap-
plies only to the workers who have resided six years or more in the Kingdom and who have completed at 
least two years of service in the company they wish to leave. However, this amendment to the sponsor-
ship rule may benefit long-term expats, especially those with much in demand training and skills: they 
can now, more than before the onset of Nitaqat, enjoy some degree of mobility within the labour market 
and put companies in competition with each other in line with their career’s interests. Since October 24, 
the Labour Ministry has also formally authorised expatriates’ family dependents to work in the private 
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sector without transferring their iqama (residency) to the employer. Again, this suggests that highly 
skilled, well-paid expatriates, who are most likely to have their families with them, may enjoy a privileged 
status as far as sponsorship is concerned.
Another blow to the sponsorship institution was witnessed in the early stage of Nitaqat with the 
anti-“cover-up” business (tasattur), a pillar of the sponsorship system, whereby sponsored expatriates run 
businesses in the name of a Saudi citizen. The amended Labour Law carries a one-year prison sentence 
and a fine of up to SR1 million, in addition to deportation, for this. The law also calls for banning the 
citizen involved from travelling abroad.
One of the main features of the Kingdom’s political economy, i.e., the political leverage of business 
classes and their close relations with the successive ruling regimes, has been an obstacle to recent state 
attempts at reforming the Saudi economy. Yet, in order to address the very pressing need of massive 
job creation in the private sector for Saudi youths, the government had to regain the upper hand on 
economic decision-making, hence the implementation of Nitaqat. Indeed, the programme has tremen-
dously limited the power of business classes over workforce recruitment. All Nitaqat measures actually 
designate the private sector as responsible for citizens’ employment and leave no room for yellow and 
red zone companies to pursue business as usual in case of violations, as described earlier. Not only do 
business owners have to recruit through replacing the foreign workforce with a national one, they also 
have to create new opportunities for locals and upgrade the work conditions in the private sector to en-
tice Saudi workers to join it. By so doing, the regime regains the upper hand on the management of the 
labour market from the private sector. Additionally, it beefs up its wavering base of popular support, as 
labour is part of the process of redistribution of resources to citizens. In any case, if Nitaqat were to fail, 
businesspeople would bear the political costs of this failure.
First Outcomes of Nitaqat: a Success?
In two and half years of Nitaqat’s implementation between September 2011 and the end of 2013, the 
stocks of Saudi workers have increased by 1,063,669 of which about 430,000 (40 per cent) are women. 
The number of Saudi working females has doubled since 2011, when it stood at 437,511. 
However, it should be noted that 41 per cent of the jobs created for Saudis were actually in the pub-
lic sector. In view of the Kingdom’s international commitment to privatizing its economy, such choices 
appear unsustainable in the long run, and labour market reform towards opening more job opportunities 
for nationals in the private sector will be a matter of international credibility for Saudi Arabia. 
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table 4: Evolution of Saudi arabia’s workforce by sector and nationality (2011-2013)
Moreover, even if Nitaqat did create job opportunities in the private sector for Saudis, 67 per cent 
of all the jobs created in the private sector went to non-Saudis. This clearly illustrates the socio-political 
challenges hampering Saudization policies and the struggle between the government and the private 
sector’s actors as regards employing more foreign labourers instead of channelling Saudi labourers to 
these posts. 
On the one hand, since the implementation of Nitaqat in 2011, an increasing number of foreign 
labourers have had to adjust their professional and residency status (change of professions and sponsors). 
Consequently, the number of work permits actually delivered in 201342 to foreign nationals has been 
very high (6.9 million), due to these adjustments and to renewals of permits. As for new labour permits, 
they will probably decrease, as indicated by the fall in number of work visas agreed upon for 2013.   This 
resembles the situation described earlier in this paper, wherein at times of crisis, business owners resort 
to “labour hoarding” which manifests their defiance vis-à-vis state’ attempts at managing the supply of 
foreign labourers. 
Figure 5: Labour documents delivered and decisions taken by type (2009-2013)  
  2011 2013 Evoluon of numbers 
  
before the correcon
campaign  
aer the correcon
campaign 2011-2013 
Sector Saudis non-Saudis Saudis non-Saudis Saudis non-Saudis Saudis non-Saudis 
Public sector 2,472,713(a) 120,691(a) n.d. n.d. 2,912,378(a) 255,000(d) +439,665 +134,309 
Private sector 844,476(b) 6,937,020(b) 1,182,562(d) 7,472,790(d) 1,466,853(d) 8,212,782(d) +622,377 +1,275,762 
Domesc sector 1,274(c) 937,869(c) n.d. n.d. 2,901(c) 1,834,000(d) +1,627 +896,131 
Total 3,318,463 7,995,580     4,382,132 10,301,782 +1,063,669 +2,306,202 
Source: Ministry of Labour; Ministry of Civil Service; CDSI.            
(a) Ministry of Civil Service figures+number of employees in the “General administraon” sector in Labour Force Surveys, given years  
   
(b)Ministry of Labour's figures in SAMA and MoL Yearbooks, given years;    
(c) Persons classified in the category “private households as employers” in Labour Force Surveys, given years    
(d) Figures for December 2013, MoL Yearbook 2013, incorporang the outcomes of November 2013' correcon campaign. 
Figures are for the mid-year (i.e., before the correcon campaign of November 2013 for the 2013 figure)
Source: Statistical Yearbook 2013, Ministry of Labour    
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However, Nitaqat may prompt new attitudes and behaviour towards foreign labourers. Labour in-
spections have become more frequent since the onset of Nitaqat: from 66,674 in 2009, they have more 
than doubled in 2013 and reached 148,575.43   
The mobility of workers on the labour market may also increase. Ministry of Labour data empha-
size the large number of sponsorship changes (“transfer of services”) involving more than a third of the 
recorded foreign labourers. In 2013, these figures soared due to the regularisation campaign conducted 
throughout the Islamic year 1435 (April 3 to November 3, 2013); sponsorship changes performed during 
2013 but outside the campaign reached 441,000, up from the 403,000 such transfers achieved in 2012 
and from the 198,000 of 2011. This may be the first step towards easing the kafala system, at least for 
certain categories of workers, even if the policy is advocated for by the Ministry of Labour as an incentive 
for companies to reach Saudization quotas if they want to retain their manpower. Though of a limited 
scope, the measure has opened the way for some mobility of workers within the Kingdom’s labour mar-
ket, which may be a psychological more than a political breakthrough.
Another of the many outcomes of Nitaqat is the amount of business closures that occurred during 
the process of adjustment to the sectorial quota of Saudization and government’s campaign against il-
legal cover-up businesses and residency and labour law violators. According to some statistics from the 
Ministry of Labour, 200,118 private sector companies in the red zone of the Nitaqat programme closed 
down in 2013, out of a total of 1.8 million. According to the ministry, 58.6 per cent of these firms were 
classified as micro and small enterprises, which are required to employ at least one Saudi national.44 
Added to the fact that private sector actors are deemed responsible for the slow progress made in absorb-
ing unemployed Saudis, the business closures may be viewed as a step displaying the Saudi government’s 
progressive take-over of the economy and the management of the labour market at the expense of the 
private sector. This suggests that the Nitaqat programme, because it addresses the socio-political context 
of Saudization, is more likely to have a lasting effect than previous workforce localisation initiatives.
Conclusion: Nitaqat and Socio-political reform in Saudi arabia
The paper addressed the socio-political background of the design and implementation of the Nitaqat 
policy of Saudization of the labour force as well as long-term, structural impediments to its rapid suc-
cess. The dependency on foreign labour in the Kingdom as well as the policies governing their socio-
political (non-)integration – also in other Gulf States –and the (non-)management of their flows into 
Saudi Arabia are indeed anchored in a specific historical and institutional setup. This does not imply that 
such policies cannot be changed. It means that they are part of a global system and their socio-political 
impact on citizens and business actors makes it is difficult for governments to repeal them straight away. 
The economic reform process, therefore, has high socio-political stakes. Yet, the necessity of economic 
reform is linked to the international credibility of the Saudi regime and also to domestic politics. Gov-
ernmental actors had no choice but to attempt to regain control over the economy and the management 
of the labour market. 
However, beyond this struggle over the management of foreign labour, another element of Nitaqat 
is bound to spark a major social upheaval: the incentives for Saudi women’s employment. As we have 
said, most Saudi women have been inactive on the job market so far; their entry into the market would 
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create a demographic competition at all levels of skills, including the highest ones, with foreign labour-
ers and Saudi men. Introducing Saudi women to the labour market has had a very far-reaching and 
politically groundbreaking effect on the country’s social and religious institutions. It breaks the taboos of 
gender segregation and males’ control over females’ spatial mobility and allows social and economic em-
powerment. The violent reaction of the most conservative sections of society reveals the stakes attached 
to such a policy. Female employment is thus the battleground between various currents of Saudi polity, 
some willing to acknowledge the need for change in social norms in the Kingdom, and other political 
forces – among whom are conservative clerics – opposing such changes. More generally, females may 
become important political allies for the regime, which needs to widen its support base. All this endows 
the Nitaqat campaign with huge social and political stakes.
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Endnotes
1. The term “Saudization” refers to the introduction of Saudi workers in the Saudi labour market, whether in 
replacement of foreign labourers or not. The term is used interchangeably with “localisation” or “indigenisa-
tion” of labour. 
2. Looney 2004
3. As emphasized by Ramady (2010), several factors hamper the success of Saudization of the workforce in the 
private sector, among which are:  1. Labour costs: Saudi workers have high reservation wages which results in 
private sector reliance on imported cheap manual labour, deployed in labour-intensive occupations. This helps 
private sector profitability despite government attempts to increase costs of hiring expatriates (residency, visa 
renewals, etc.); 2. Social and cultural perceptions whereby Saudis feel socially degraded to take up and seri-
ously pursue certain types of jobs; 3. Control over process of production: short-term employment contracts 
and sponsorship allow for controlling and disciplining expatriate workers as opposed to Saudi workers; 4. 
Reluctance of local populations to integrate into multi-cultural work environments, fearing that it might 
degrade their existing status. 5. Job tenure: it is more difficult to fire Saudi workers than foreign workers; 
6. Inadequate qualifications of Saudi employees, lack of knowledge of English/foreign languages or a non-
technical background; 7. Reluctance to move for taking on available job opportunities. Many other references 
can be cited, among which: Al-Dosary and Rahman (2005; 2010); Cordesman (2002); Looney (2004 a; 2004 
b); Mellahi (2000; 2007); Mellahi and Al-Hinai (2000); Mellahi and Wood (2002). 
4. Ramady 2013; Sadi 2013; Hertog 2014; Peck 2014.
5. Lawless, Seccombe 1986: 548.
6. Lawless, Seccombe, 1986: 570.
7. Longuenesse 1985: 176-178.
8. Lawless, Seccombe, 1986: 571.
9. A “rent” is an income earned from natural resources or trading of strategic resources, as opposed to income 
earned from capital or labour.
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10. In the rentier state theory, guaranteed income from the state, coupled with the absence of direct tax levies in 
return for political allegiance to the rulers is seen as the oil-based “rentier” social contract, summed up in the 
aphorism “No taxation without representation” (Beblawi, 1990: 89).
11. The sponsorship probably dates back to a pre-Islamic practice later codified by Islamic law, originally referring 
to the protection granted by a tribal group to its guests and to travellers crossing its territory. In Muslim law, 
the term kafala designates the fact of adopting a child or that of becoming its tutor.  
12. Beaugé 1986: 109.
13. For workers who are not in upper income brackets and/ or in certain categories of occupation, bringing family 
members depends on the goodwill of local sponsors.
14. Longva 1997.
15. Longva 1999.
16. Longuenesse 1985: 188.
17. Pakkiasamy 2004.
18. Okruhlik 1999.
19. Chaudhry 1997: 275; Kostiner 2009: 75.
20. The shift to Arab labourers after 1948 and their progressive outnumbering by Asians during the 1980s were 
the result of political decisions by local rulers. Asian workers, for instance, “were regarded as a more politically 
compliant workforce, removed from the currents of Arab nationalism and Islamism” (Humphrey, 1993: 7). 
This is not to mention the eviction of some one million Yemenis employed in Saudi Arabia after August 1990, 
for Yemen took a neutral stance and refused to support the Saudi invitation to join in the efforts to oust Iraqi 
troops from Kuwait. 
21. A period of amnesty for labourers and sojourners in irregular situation (without residency or labour permits, 
having entered without visa, working for someone else than their sponsor, in a profession other than that 
stated on the Iqama (residency card), for instance) lasted from April 3 to November 3, 2013. On November 4 
(first day of the Islamic year 1436), a crackdown on the remaining irregulars started. As a result of both cam-
paigns, 2,423,779 changes of profession and 2,615,280 changes of sponsor, in addition to 3,890,916 labour 
permit issuances were achieved. Final exits recorded were 713,524 and an additional 1,086,593 workers left 
without leave of absence (Ministry of Labour, Statistical Yearbook 2013, table 36). 
22. To date, Saudi Arabia has conducted five censuses: in 1962; 1974; 1992; 2004 and 2010. The first Saudi census 
(1962) is usually not used, as it did not cover the whole of the resident population. The 1974 census is the 
first comprehensive one in Saudi history. However, its rate of coverage and accuracy of data are considered 
weak. In 1992, census figures, along with ensuing estimates of the Saudi population and rates of demographic 
growth for the following years, were probably inflated (Winckler 2008). Between 2004 and 2010 censuses, 
Saudi population figures seem consistent with natural increase figures. As for non-national population, it is 
likely that it is underestimated in official counts. 
23. http://gulfmigration.eu/naturalisations-by-sex-saudi-arabia-1974-2000/
24. Tabutin, Schoumaker 2005: 535.
25. Regional geopolitics probably played a role as well: given the political and symbolic role that Saudi Arabia 
aspires to play within the Arab and Islamic worlds, demography has always been a challenge of a political 
nature for the regime. The Kingdom cannot measure up to Egypt and Turkey in the region, and not even to 
Yemen and Iraq. Its all-time rival is Iran, its Shia political and ideological competitor for leadership over the 
Muslim world.
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26. The labour force includes the occupied labour force (also called the “labour force with a job”) and the unem-
ployed. Activity rates are the ratio of active persons (employed+unemployed) to the total population for the 
given age groups or sub-populations. Rates are calculated for the age groups 15-64 years, to allow for inter-
national comparison. 
27. http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/12/26/257217.html.
28. Such as the unemployment benefit granted to Saudi nationals since 2011. However, the rise of unemploy-
ment rates started in 2009 as witnessed in Figure 3.
29. Unemployment rates are the ratio of unemployed persons to the active population (i.e., in the labour force: 
employed+unemployed). This assumes that unemployment data is not underestimated, deliberately or due to 
imperfect registration or measurement methods. For example, unemployment in the early 2000s was esti-
mated at 9.6 per cent, while unofficial estimates put it as high as 15-20 or even 30 per cent (Malik, Niblock 
2006: 103 ; Al-Dosary, Rahman 2005 ; Mellahi, Al-Hinai 2000).  
30. Al-Dosary and Rahman 2005.
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33. http://gulfmigration.eu/glmm-database/legal-module/?ls=1&ind=labmig.
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